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Introduction 
A new favorite weapon of the anti-abortion rights movement is 
legislation that singles out abortion facilities and providers for 
unnecessary and burdensome regulations (targeted regulation of 
abortion providers or “TRAP” laws).  TRAP laws have infamously 
led to the closure of dozens of clinics in Texas and would have 
shuttered Mississippi’s sole remaining clinic until that law was 
enjoined.  TRAP laws purport to promote women’s health, but they 
 
† Executive Director, ACLU of Montana. This article was written while 
the author was a Professor of Law at CUNY School of Law. For helpful 
feedback on the ideas presented here, the author thanks participants at 
the Case Western symposium, “The Rhetoric of Reproduction”; and 
Cilla Smith, Jack Balkin, and participants at a roundtable of the Yale 
Program for the Study of Reproductive Justice. The author also thanks 
Elisabeth Wise, CUNY School of Law ’16, for her excellent research 
assistance. 
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are part of a broader strategy to dismantle the right to abortion 
incrementally.  States are constitutionally prohibited from enacting 
laws with the intent to hinder access to abortion.  The question 
remains how to prove to courts that TRAP laws have this purpose or 
are otherwise unconstitutional. 
Dormant commerce clause analysis may provide a useful 
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of TRAP laws that 
discriminate against abortion clinics without a valid medical reason.  
Generally speaking, dormant commerce clause case law is an 
appropriate source of comparison because it addresses a similar 
phenomenon to TRAP laws, namely a state’s desire to pursue a 
politically motivated - and often politically popular - but 
impermissible goal.  In the dormant commerce clause context, this 
goal is to protect local economic interests against interstate 
competition.  Because the goal is constitutionally prohibited, however, 
states attempt to justify these laws on other grounds, such as 
environmental protection.    
Specifically, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence provides two 
potential answers to the question of how to prove TRAP laws’ 
unconstitutionality.  Dormant commerce clause case law first analyzes 
whether the law discriminates against interstate commerce.1  One 
aspect of this analysis is an independent purpose inquiry that provides 
a model for courts seeking to identify whether a TRAP law was 
motivated by the impermissible purpose of impeding access to 
abortion.  When laws do discriminate against interstate commerce, 
dormant commerce clause case law requires states to justify the law 
on grounds other than economic protectionism. Assuming the state 
declares a valid alternative purpose, the court then examines whether 
the state could have pursued that purpose through less discriminatory 
means.  This requirement that the state justify its law with a valid 
reason and the least-discriminatory-means analysis are also well-suited 
for analyzing the credibility of the woman-centered, medical safety 
rationale states offer for TRAP laws.   
Dormant commerce clause case law thus offers support for 
revitalizing Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s near-dormant “purpose 
prong,” by demonstrating that identification of illegitimate legislative 
purpose is a judicially manageable task.  Alternatively, it allows 
judges to examine the supposed factual foundations for TRAP laws 
without a direct examination of their purpose. 
 
1. See infra Part II. 
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I.  TRAP Laws and the Undue Burden Standard 
A. TRAP Laws 
TRAP laws are a tool that anti-abortion advocates have 
employed as part of an overarching strategy to attack the abortion 
right indirectly, by burdening it with excessive regulations. This 
strategy was devised as a way to undermine the right to abortion in 
the absence of a Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe v. Wade.2  
TRAP laws single out abortion facilities and providers for special, 
onerous regulations that are often extremely costly if not impossible 
to meet.  States began to enact TRAP laws in the years after Roe v. 
Wade.3  Because Roe v. Wade limited the kinds of restrictions that 
could be imposed on pre-viability abortions, however, lower federal 
courts in the early 1980s invalidated many of these regulations.4   
In the 1990s, after Casey changed the standard for abortion 
restrictions to allow more regulation in the pre-viability period, 
TRAP laws were revived.  States began taking more steps to regulate 
abortion facilities, such as setting minimum size requirements for 
examination, procedure, and recovery rooms.5  Challenges to these 
 
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  The strategy of chipping away at 
the right to abortion is intended to burden access while also “chang[ing] 
hearts and minds” on the issue, in the hope that the Supreme Court will 
eventually be persuaded to reverse Roe. See Memorandum from James 
Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Attorneys at Law, Bopp, Coleson & 
Bostrom, To Whom It May Concern, at 5 (Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with 
the author). 
3. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: TARGETED REGULATIONS 
OF ABORTION PROVIDERS (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf. 
4. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 426-433 (1983) (holding an Akron, Ohio, ordinance unconstitutional 
that, among other things, required all abortions after the first trimester 
to be performed in a hospital), overruled on other grounds by Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Ragsdale v. 
Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1374 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding room size 
requirements not justified by important state health interests); 
Mahoning Women’s Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456, 456 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(holding unconstitutional a Youngstown, Ohio, abortion ordinance 
which imposed costly medical and building code regulations on clinics 
performing first trimester abortions), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S. 
918 (1980); Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 
F.2d 1141, 1154 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding unconstitutional regulations 
promulgated by the Chicago Board of Health setting forth who could 
perform an abortion, where it could be performed, and establishing 
physical plant requirements).  
5. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703, 
716-18 (D.S.C. 1999) (enjoining regulations, including minimum size 
requirements of recovery and procedure rooms and specific requirements 
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laws were often unsuccessful in the Casey’s wake.  For example, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld strict TRAP requirements including regulations 
governing the minimum width of procedure and recovery rooms.6  The 
court was unconcerned about the discriminatory nature of these 
regulations, declaring that “abortion clinics may rationally be 
regulated as a class while other clinics or medical practices are not.”7 
TRAP laws have gained momentum since 2010.8   As these laws 
have proliferated and many clinics have closed, courts have been 
divided on whether particularly onerous TRAP laws impose an undue 
burden.9  The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on these laws, but it 
has heard oral arguments on a Texas TRAP law, 10 and the Court 
temporarily blocked a Louisiana TRAP law.11 
 
for janitors’ closets), reversed, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); Pro-
Choice Mississippi v. Thompson, No. 3:96-cv-00596-WHB, at *26-28 
(S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1996) (preliminarily enjoining detailed and onerous 
physical plant requirements).  
6. See Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 159; see also Women’s Med. 
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 604-06 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
hospital transfer agreement requirement leading to a clinic’s closure did 
not constitute an undue burden).  But see Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. 
Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down admitting 
privileges requirement). 
7. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 159.  
8. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 3, at 1; Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers: Avoiding the “TRAP,” CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
(Aug. 2003), http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/default/ 
files/documents/pub_bp_avoidingthetrap.pdf. 
9. Compare Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 
(7th Cir. 2013) (affirming preliminary injunction of Wisconsin admitting 
privileges law), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); Jackson Women’s 
Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming 
preliminary injunction of Mississippi admitting privileges requirement); 
and Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1381 
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (permanently enjoining Alabama admitting privileges 
law) with Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding Texas admitting 
privileges requirement and medication abortion restrictions); Whole 
Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding Texas 
ambulatory surgical center requirement), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 
(2015). 
10. See Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting facial challenge to Texas ambulatory surgical center 
requirements), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
11. June Med. Serv. v. Gee No. 15A880, 2016 WL853548 (U.S. Mar. 4, 
2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/15A880-June-Medical-Serv.-v.-Gee-Order.pdf 
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TRAP laws attack Roe indirectly but with potentially devastating 
effects.  Many TRAP laws impose unnecessary and expensive physical 
plant requirements on abortion facilities, for example requiring they 
meet the building standards of ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs).  
A Mississippi ASC law enjoined in part in 1996, for example, required 
that facilities providing more than ten abortions per month have six-
foot wide corridors; doors measuring forty-four inches; five separate 
bathrooms; and separate locker rooms for male and female nurses, 
including a bathroom in each locker room, among other 
requirements.12 A similar and more recent TRAP law in Texas 
requires that all facilities offering abortions meet ASC requirements, 
even if they provide abortions only through medication rather than 
surgery.13  Other variations of TRAP laws target the medical 
professionals who perform abortions, for example requiring that they 
obtain admitting privileges at nearby hospitals.14   
ASC and admitting privileges requirements have been extremely 
effective at shutting down clinics.  Dozens of clinics across Texas 
closed after that state implemented both restrictions.15  Texas’s ASC 
standards, which are typical, “prescribe electrical, heating, 
ventilation, air conditioning, plumbing, and other physical plant 
requirements as well as staffing mandates, space utilization, minimum 
square footage, and parking design.”16  ASC requirements, which are 
not designed for procedures as safe as abortion, are prohibitively 
costly for many clinics to implement.17  These requirements apply to 
clinics that do not even perform surgeries but rather only offer 
 
12. Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Thompson, No. 3:96-cv-00596-WHB, slip op. 
at 18-19 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1996) (preliminarily enjoining multiple 
TRAP provisions including ASC requirements).  
13. See Whole Women’s Health, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (ruling Texas 
ASC law constitutional except as applied to one clinic) cert. granted, 
136 S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
14. See Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 595 (upholding Texas 
admitting privileges law). 
15. Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Texas Limits on 
Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, (June 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/us/court-upholds-texas-law-
criticized-as-blocking-access-to-abortions.html?_r=0. 
16. See Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681(W.D. 
Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted 136 
S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
17. See, e.g., id. at 682 (“If a clinic is able to make renovations to comply, 
those costs will undisputedly approach 1 million dollars and will most 
likely exceed 1.5 million dollars.”). 
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abortions induced through medication.18  Some clinics cannot 
implement the changes at all because the physical sites on which their 
buildings are located cannot accommodate the requirements.19   
Admitting privileges requirements can be equally effective in 
closing clinics.  These laws require that abortion providers obtain 
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital, generally within a 
prescribed distance from the clinic.  These requirements may be 
unrealistic or impossible for abortion providers to meet for reasons 
unrelated to provider competence.  For example, providers often fail 
to meet the requirements for hospital privileges because their patients 
so rarely end up in the emergency room.20  Some hospitals impose a 
proximity condition for admitting privileges (requiring that the 
provider live or work within a specific radius surrounding the 
hospital) that providers may not meet.21  Hospitals may refuse to 
extend privileges to abortion providers for political reasons.22 
Admitting privileges requirements are medically unnecessary 
because, as the Seventh Circuit has pointed out, “Of course any 
doctor (in fact any person) can bring a patient to an emergency room 
to be treated by the doctors employed there (these days called 
‘hospitalists’), and . . . [a] hospital that has an emergency room is 
obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even 
if the patient is uninsured.”23  Indeed, in most states admitting 
privileges are not required for any other procedures performed outside 
of a hospital, including surgeries riskier or more complex than 
abortions.24 
 
18. Id. 
19. See id. (noting that the cost of buying land and constructing a new 
compliant clinic would likely cost more than $3 million). 
20. See Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 797 (7th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); see also Planned 
Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 
2014) (noting that “many hospitals require that a doctor with active-
staff or courtesy-staff privileges admit a certain number of patients or 
perform a certain number of procedures on a regular basis”). 
21. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1381 
(striking down Alabama’s law). 
22. See Pro-Choice Mississippi at *21 (invoking this rationale in enjoining 
requirement of written transfer agreement with hospital). 
23. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 787-88; see also Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899-900 
(W.D. Tex. 2013) (“A lack of admitting privileges on the part of an 
abortion provider is of no consequence when a patient presents at a 
hospital emergency room. By law, no hospital can refuse to provide 
emergency care.”), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). 
24. See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 789. 
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B.   The Undue Burden Standard and TRAP Laws: An Awkward Fit 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,25 the Supreme Court upheld 
what it referred to as the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade,26 but it 
established a new standard for evaluating abortion restrictions 
applicable in the pre-viability period.  The Roe v. Wade framework 
had not permitted any pre-viability restrictions that furthered the 
state’s interest in potential life.27  The Casey joint opinion concluded 
that this aspect of the Roe framework “undervalued” the state’s 
interest in embryonic or fetal life.28  The joint opinion held that the 
state could enact pre-viability restrictions to promote its interest in 
potential life, so long as these restrictions did not impose an undue 
burden.  The Court defined an undue burden as a law that has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
women seeking abortions.29 
Although states did enact some TRAP laws in the post-Roe 
period, as discussed above, these laws were routinely struck down 
under Roe.30  The Justices did not have occasion to revisit these 
rulings in Casey, since the major provisions challenged in that case 
were not TRAP laws.  Other than reporting requirements, which the 
Court found not burdensome, the restrictions addressed in Casey all 
supported either the state’s or private parties’ interest in potential 
life.31  Pennsylvania’s waiting period and state-mandated information 
provision allowed the state to express its preference for childbirth.  
The husband notice and parental consent provisions effectively 
allowed private parties to intervene in a woman’s abortion decision if 
they disagreed with it.   
It is therefore not surprising that, in Casey, the Court’s discussion 
about the constitutionality of abortion restrictions was closely 
intertwined with its discussion about how Roe v. Wade had 
misapprehended the nature of the woman’s interest in an abortion 
(construing it as too absolute), thus undermining the state’s interest 
in the embryo or fetus.  The Justices were primarily concerned with 
balancing the state’s (or private parties’) moral opposition to abortion 
 
25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992). 
26. Id. at 846. 
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-134 (1973). 
28. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873. 
29. Id. at 877. 
30. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
31. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (noting that reporting requirements served 
women’s interest in health because “information with respect to actual 
patients is a vital element of medical research”). 
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with the woman’s right to decide to terminate her pregnancy.  
Although the Justices contemplated the possibility of state interests 
beyond the interest in potential life, specifically the state’s interest in 
the woman’s health, they were clearly focused on reasons why the 
state would want to regulate abortion, not simply as any medical 
procedure, but as a decision with moral implications the state might 
find objectionable.32  As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Planned 
Parenthood v. Humble, because of this, “[Casey’s] application of the 
‘undue burden’ standard is often not extendable in obvious ways to 
the context of a law purporting to promote maternal health.”33 
The Casey joint opinion articulated the undue burden standard as 
follows: 
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion 
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid 
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in 
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice, not hinder it. . . . whether a law designed to further the 
State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on 
the woman’s decision before fetal viability could be 
constitutional. The answer is no.34 
The Court then added, almost as an afterthought, “Regulations 
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid 
if they do not constitute an undue burden.”35  When it restated the 
new undue burden framework, the Justices noted: “As with any 
medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the 
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health 
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial 
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on 
the right.”36  The Court seemed generally to assume states’ good faith 
in regulating abortion as it would other medical procedures and 
appeared confident in courts’ ability to identify regulations not so 
intended. 
 
32. Planned Parenthood of Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“The analysis in both Casey and Gonzales focused on state 
laws purporting to advance the state’s interest in fetal life”). 
33. Id. (citation omitted). 
34. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-77 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
35. Id. at 878. 
36. Casey at 879 (emphases added). 
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Thus, the Casey compromise was mainly about letting the state 
express its objection to abortion without interfering with the woman’s 
decision.  TRAP laws, on the other hand, are defended as health 
regulations, not as laws intended to advance the state’s interest in 
potential life.  Indeed, although government officials have not always 
been disciplined about sticking to the women’s-health script,37 the 
laws’ constitutionality depends on the state eschewing any purposes 
related to embryonic or fetal welfare.  TRAP laws do not address the 
moral aspects of the abortion decision in any way.38  The only way 
they could advance the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus would 
be by shutting down clinics.  To admit to this goal, however, would 
be to acknowledge an impermissible purpose to impose a substantial 
obstacle to abortion access. 
C.  Probing TRAP Laws’ Justifications 
TRAP laws purport to regulate for women’s health, not potential 
life, but this reason is clearly pretextual.  The laws single out abortion 
for different and more stringent treatment than comparable or even 
more dangerous procedures.  For example, ASC standards are not 
imposed on facilities performing outpatient surgeries that carry risks 
far higher than abortion.39  This singling out of abortion is 
incongruous in light of the fact that abortion is an exceptionally safe 
medical procedure, with only 0.3% of patients in the United States 
experiencing a major complication.40 
The national advocacy groups promoting TRAP laws admit to 
the pretext.  American United for Life (AUL), for example, is an 
organization whose mission is to end legal abortion.41  AUL publishes  
37. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
38. The Supreme Court strained to find such a connection when it upheld 
the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, by claiming that the 
targeted procedure was especially morally repugnant. Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 155-62 (2007). Even that attenuated moral tie 
cannot be asserted of TRAP laws. 
39. See Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 790 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (citing higher risks of colonoscopy), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2841 (2014). 
40. Susan A. Cohen, New Data on Abortion Incidence, Safety Illuminate 
Key Aspects of Worldwide Abortion Debate, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 
2, 4 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 
797 (“Complications of abortion are estimated to occur in only one out 
of 111 physician-performed aspiration abortions (the most common type 
of surgical abortion); and 96 percent of complications are “minor.” 
(citations omitted)). 
41. About, AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/about-aul/ 
(describing AUL’s mission as “[a]chieving comprehensive legal protection 
for human life from conception to natural death”). 
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a legislative playbook of detailed strategic advice and model 
legislation for state legislators.  The playbook advocates laws like 
TRAP measures because “state abortion-related laws designed to 
protect women’s health” are more likely to withstand court 
challenges.42  At the same time, AUL acknowledges that these laws 
also serve the interest of protecting “unborn children’s lives.”43  
However, as discussed above,44 a TRAP law cannot simultaneously 
serve both of these interests.  The laws “protect life” not by making 
abortion safer for women but by making it harder and more expensive 
to obtain or, at their most successful, by making it unavailable to 
some women.  TRAP laws thus exemplify the favored approach of 
mainstream anti-abortion advocacy groups like the National Right to 
Life Committee and AUL.  These groups seek to dismantle the right 
to abortion incrementally by whittling away at abortion access, a 
strategy they see as more viable in the current political climate than 
seeking an outright ban.45 
AUL, for example, calls the incremental approach an “all-or-
something” approach and contrasts it with the “all-or-nothing” 
approach abortion rights opponents in Canada have pursued.  “The 
Canadian all-or-nothing approach failed. The American all-or-
something approach has established legislative fences against abortion 
that have actually limited and reduced abortion . . . .”46  AUL’s 
playbook explains how restrictions like TRAP laws were not 
permissible under Roe’s original framework,47 but now offer a way to 
undermine Roe indirectly.  “[T]hese [incremental] laws—such as . . . 
abortion clinic regulations—save lives now.  When a direct assault is 
not feasible because of obstacles beyond our control, it is necessary to 
design and implement a larger and broader assault on the target and 
its foundation.”48  AUL openly touts its strategy of cumulatively 
imposing burdens, describing as a prime example how this strategy 
succeeded in reducing abortion access in Mississippi to a single clinic.49  
42. DENISE M. BURKE, ET AL.,  AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING 
LIFE 2013 17 (2013)  (“[I]n light of Casey and Gonzales, laws that 
include a stated women’s health justification are more likely to 
withstand judicial scrutiny.”). 
43. Id.  
44. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38 
45. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment 
of Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 245, 260-61 (2013). 
46. BURKE, supra note 42, at 39. 
47. Id. at 38. 
48. Id. at 41. 
49. Id. at 55- 56. 
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State officials exulting in the passage of TRAP laws have praised 
the measures both for protecting embryonic life and safeguarding 
women’s health. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton described the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding his state’s ASC law a “victory for 
life and women’s health.”50  After Texas passed its ASC requirement, 
Texas Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst gleefully tweeted a map predicting 
how many clinics would shut down and stating that the law would 
essentially ban abortion statewide.51  After signing Mississippi’s 
admitting privileges law, which would have closed the state’s last 
remaining abortion clinic, Gov. Phil Bryant declared, “We are going 
to continue to try to work to end abortion in Mississippi and this is 
an historic day to begin that process.”52  
Obvious as it may be that TRAP laws are intended to burden 
access to abortion rather than promote women’s health, the question 
remains how to prove this in court under the undue burden standard.  
There are two possible ways to expose the pretextual health and 
safety rationale behind TRAP laws.  The first is by directly 
examining a TRAP law’s purpose.  The second is by making the state 
justify a TRAP law with attention to whether the state has employed 
the least discriminatory means of regulating abortion.  If a state 
treats abortion differently (and more burdensomely) than comparable 
medical procedures but cannot justify the differential treatment on 
medical grounds, it is likely that the purpose is a pretext for the 
state’s ideological opposition to abortion.  Dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence can help with each of these approaches. 
1.  Attacking Purpose Directly 
The undue burden standard holds that an abortion restriction is 
unconstitutional if its purpose or effect is to impose a substantial 
obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions.53 Thus, one way to 
attack the invalidity of TRAP law is to attack its purpose directly by 
proving that the women’s health rationale is a pretext, and that the 
real purpose is to reduce access to abortion.  The “purpose prong” of 
 
50. Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 15. 
51. See Christy Hoppe, Lt. Gov. Dewhurst Says in Tweet That Abortion 
Bill All About Shutting Down Accessibility, THE DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS (June 13, 2013), 
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/lt-gov-dewhurst-says-in-
tweet-that-abortion-bill-all-about-shutting-down-accessibility.html/. 
52. Jeffrey Hess, Governor Bryant Signs New Regulations For Mississippi’s 
Only Abortion Clinic, MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC BROADCASTING  (April 12, 
2012), http://archive.mpbonline.org/News/article/ 
governor_bryant_signs_new_regulations_for_mississippis_only_abort
ion_clinic#sthash.ri8xGoJd.dpuf. 
53. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-77 (1992). 
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the Casey standard, however, has generally not been an effective 
vehicle for challenging abortion restrictions.54  In Mazurek v. 
Armstrong,55 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a law 
prohibiting medical providers other than physicians from performing 
abortions.  In this per curiam decision, the Court refused to find an 
improper purpose despite evidence that an anti-abortion-rights group 
had drafted the law, and even though there was no evidence to 
support the state’s women’s-safety rationale.   
In contrast to its reluctance to find improper purposes, the Court 
has readily found valid state purposes for abortion restrictions based 
on flimsy factual foundations.56  In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court 
held that the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act had a valid 
purpose, stating that Congress needed only a “rational basis to act.” 57   
The Court located this “rational basis” in part in the theory that 
women might come to regret their abortions, even as it admitted that 
the theory lacked scientific support.58 
Some scholars have argued for a reinvigoration of the purpose 
prong.59 Lower courts also seem increasingly interested in probing the 
rationales states put forward for TRAP laws and have scrutinized 
whether the stated reasons hold up factually.  While the courts have 
generally not formally applied Casey’s purpose prong, or have even 
expressly disavowed doing so,60 their examination of the states’ 
justifications reflect a new focus on states’ purposes in regulating 
abortion.  For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Strange, United 
States District Judge Myron Thompson extensively examined 
Alabama’s arguments that its admitting privileges requirement was 
 
54. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation, It’s the Facts 
that Matter, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 149, 150 (2013); Jenny Jarrard, Note, 
The Failed Purpose Prong: Women’s Right To Choose In Theory, Not 
In Fact, Under The Undue Burden Standard, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 469 (2014). 
55. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997). 
56. Borgmann, supra note 54, at 149. 
57. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007). 
58. Id. at 159. 
59. See, e.g, Priscilla Smith, If the Purpose Fits: The Two Functions of  
Casey’s Purpose Inquiry, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1135, 1169-71 (2014); 
Note, After Ayotte: The Need To Defend Abortion Rights With 
Renewed “Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552 (2006). 
60. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 
1341 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (“Since the court finds that the statute would 
have the effect of imposing a substantial obstacle, it is unnecessary to 
reach the purpose claim . . .”). 
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needed to protect women’s health.61  Thompson concluded that 
Alabama’s justifications for the law were “weak, at best.”62 
In reviewing a preliminary injunction of Wisconsin’s admitting 
privileges law, Judge Richard Posner, writing for a panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, skeptically 
reviewed the state’s women’s safety rationale, noting that “[i]n this 
case the medical grounds thus far presented . . . are feeble.”63  
Similarly, in a recent decision blocking Texas’s ASC requirements and 
enjoining its admitting-privileges law as to two specific clinics, United 
States District Judge Lee Yeakel found the state’s health rationales 
“largely unfounded,” “without a reliable basis,” “weak,” “speculative,” 
and “not credible.”64 
Dormant commerce clause analysis includes a purpose inquiry 
that evaluates whether facially neutral laws nevertheless have the 
“purpose or effect” of discriminating against interstate commerce.65  
This framework can help courts evaluate whether a TRAP law was 
passed in order to burden access to abortion rather than for the 
stated reason of protecting women’s health.  
2.  Attacking Purpose Indirectly 
A second way to expose an unconstitutional purpose behind an 
abortion restriction is to make the state justify the law.  This 
approach smokes out illegitimate purposes indirectly.66  As shown 
above, several recent federal court decisions that have examined the 
factual foundations supposedly necessitating TRAP laws have 
recognized how “feeble” those footings are.67  In these cases, judges 
have typically applied a balancing test for examining legislative 
purpose.  They first assess the extent of the burden an abortion 
restriction imposes.  Where the burden is severe, they have required a 
commensurate burden of justification by the state.   
 
61. See id. 
62. Id. at 1342. 
63. Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 
(7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014). 
64. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684-85 (W.D. 
Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 
499 (2015). The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected Judge Yeakel’s 
reasoning. 790 F.3d at 585 (stating that plaintiffs “failed to proffer 
competent evidence contradicting the legislature’s statement of a 
legitimate purpose for H.B. 2”). 
65. See infra Part II.B. 
66. Borgmann, supra note 54, at 150; Smith, supra note 59, at 1137. 
67. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. 
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For example, when Judge Thompson struck down Alabama’s 
admitting-privileges law in Planned Parenthood v. Strange,68 he 
weighed the burdens the law imposed against the strength of 
Alabama’s interest in the law.  Judge Thompson concluded that 
Alabama’s law imposed “significant harms” on women,69 and, as noted 
above, he found the state’s justifications for the law “weak, at best.”70  
Judge Richard Posner likewise explained, in examining Wisconsin’s 
admitting-privileges law: “The feebler the [state’s] medical grounds, 
the likelier the burden, even if slight, to be ‘undue’ in the sense of 
disproportionate or gratuitous.”71  Judge Yeakel, in reviewing Texas’s 
ASC law, balanced the predicted drastic reduction in abortion clinics 
against the state’s safety rationales, which he found flimsy.72 In 
reviewing Arizona restrictions on medication abortions, the Ninth 
Circuit explained that “we compare the extent of the burden a law 
imposes on a woman’s right to abortion with the strength of the 
state’s justification for the law.”73 
Dormant commerce clause case law can help courts willing to 
probe states’ justifications for TRAP laws.  Abortion facility and 
provider regulations are usually discriminatory on their face.74  As 
such, the more appropriate analog in the dormant commerce clause 
analysis might in fact not be the purpose analysis but the strict test 
courts apply to discriminatory laws.75  This test requires a heavy 
burden of justification on the part of the state.76 
3.  Why a New Approach Is Needed 
The Casey undue burden standard is primarily focused on laws 
that openly advance the state’s interest in potential life.77 As such, it 
is not well-suited to analyzing TRAP laws that purport to promote 
maternal health, while serving an underlying goal of hindering access 
 
68. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1342 
(M.D. Ala. 2014). 
69. Id. at 1355. 
70. Id. at 1342. 
71. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. 
72. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
73. Planned Parenthood of Ariz. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
74. See infra Part II.C. 
75. See infra Part II.A. 
76. Id. 
77. See supra Part I.B. 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Borrowing From Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in Analyzing 
Abortion Clinic Regulations 
55 
to abortion.78   Some federal courts have adapted the Casey 
framework to employ a balancing test in examining a women’s health 
rationale for abortion restrictions.79  However, this approach has some 
disadvantages.  In particular, as discussed above, recent approaches 
have linked the state’s burden of justification for its law to the extent 
of the burden the law places on women.  This link requires that much 
of the litigation in a TRAP law challenge be focused on the extent to 
which a law has the effect of imposing an undue burden. 
Focusing on effects is potentially problematic for two reasons.  
First, the approach fails to make purpose a truly distinct prong, 
despite Casey’s clear designation of the two prongs as separate.  
Second, many TRAP laws are challenged on a pre-enforcement basis.  
Pre-enforcement challenges are critical because TRAP laws have the 
potential to force clinics to close, results that could be irrevocable 
even if the litigation is ultimately successful.  Following Texas’s 
enactment of admitting privileges and ASC requirements, twenty-two 
of forty-one clinics across the state closed.80  When a law is challenged 
before it is enforced, however, it can be very difficult to prove to a 
court’s satisfaction that the law will have the predicted effects.  When 
the Fifth Circuit initially granted a stay of the district court’s 
preliminary injunction of Texas’s admitting privileges law,81 allowing 
the law to go into effect pending the litigation, the plaintiffs appealed 
to the Supreme Court for emergency relief. The Court refused to 
intervene, 82 and a rash of clinic closed.83   
Dormant commerce clause case law can help avoid these problems 
by suggesting approaches either for directly examining a TRAP law’s 
 
78. See id. 
79. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen 738 F. 3d 
786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); Planned 
Parenthood v. Humble, 753 F.3d at 912; Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. 
v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1336-37 (M.D. Ala. 2014); Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. 
Supp. 2d 891, 898 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th 
Cir. 2014); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
80. Lawrence Hurley, Impact of Texas Clinic Law at Issue in Abortion Case 
Before Supreme Court, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-usa-court-abortion-idUSKCN0W35H5. 
81. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013). 
82. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
134 S. Ct. 506, 507 (2013). 
83. Irin Carmon, What You Need to Know About the Texas Abortion Case, 
MSNBC (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/what-you-
need-know-about-the-texas-abortion-case-scotus. 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Borrowing From Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in Analyzing 
Abortion Clinic Regulations 
56 
purpose, or for requiring the state to justify a law that discriminates 
against abortion, without linking that analysis to a demonstration of 
unduly burdensome effects. 
II.   DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS AND ITS 
RELEVANCE TO ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
TRAP LAWS  
A.  Overview of Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis 
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution gives 
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.84  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted this clause to have a “negative” or “dormant” 
aspect that protects Congress’s power by prohibiting states or 
localities from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate 
commerce, in the absence of congressional approval.85  The evil the 
dormant commerce clause intends to prevent is economic 
protectionism by individual states.86  For this reason, dormant 
commerce clause doctrine is especially wary of state and local laws 
that discriminate against interstate commerce.  Such laws are 
presumptively invalid regardless of the burdens they impose.87   
A law may discriminate against interstate commerce in one of 
three ways.  It may discriminate on its face,88 or it may be facially 
neutral but have either a discriminatory purpose89 or a discriminatory 
effect.90  If it discriminates in any of these ways, dormant commerce 
clause analysis applies a strict test for evaluating the law, known as 
“virtually per se invalidity.”91  Under this test, the burden is on the 
state to show that the law was motivated by a purpose other than 
economic protectionism.   
While states are permitted to discriminate against interstate 
commerce if they act for reasons other than economic protectionism, 
 
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power “to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with 
the Indian tribes.”). 
85. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 592 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
86. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1996); see HP Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33, 537-38 (1949). 
87. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).  
88. Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992). 
89. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984). 
90. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 n. 19 (1986). 
91. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. 
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this framework–placing the burden on the state to justify a 
discriminatory law–makes sense because historically economic 
protectionism has been a primary motivation for such discriminatory 
laws.92  Furthermore, courts need to insure against the particular, 
corrosive harms that laws motivated by economic protectionism can 
cause.93 
Even assuming the state meets its burden of showing that the law 
was passed for a purpose other than economic protection, the court’s 
inquiry is not finished.  The court next asks whether there are less 
discriminatory means to accomplish the same purpose.94  The tailoring 
analysis under this part of the dormant commerce clause framework is 
akin to strict scrutiny, so states may easily fail this “means” 
analysis.95 
B.  Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause Framework to Discern an 
Unconstitutional Purpose for TRAP Laws 
Dormant commerce clause doctrine resembles the undue burden 
standard for abortion in that, if a state law is passed with the purpose 
of discriminating against interstate commerce, a court will invalidate 
it without proceeding to examine the burdens the law imposes on 
interstate commerce. Thus, like the undue burden standard, dormant 
commerce clause doctrine includes an independent “purpose” clause.   
Recent federal court decisions have applied a purpose analysis 
under the dormant commerce clause to determine whether a law that 
is neutral on its face intentionally discriminates against interstate 
commerce.96  This test resembles the test applied under the equal 
protection clause to determine whether a facially neutral law was 
motivated by discriminatory intent.  Like in equal protection case 
law, courts apply a list of factors to help identify a purpose to 
discriminate.  These factors include statements by lawmakers; the 
sequence of events leading up to statute’s adoption, including 
 
92. See id. at 623-34; H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 534-38. 
93. H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538-39. 
94. See generally Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (when 
discrimination against commerce is demonstrated, the burden falls on 
the state to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the 
statute and the unavailability of non-discriminatory alternatives 
adequate to preserve local interests). 
95. See, e.g., id. at 338 (invalidating law and noting that the state chose 
“the most discriminatory means even though nondiscriminatory 
alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State’s purported legitimate 
local purpose more effectively”). 
96. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Waste Mgt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Jones v. Gale, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (D. Neb. 2005). 
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irregularities in procedures used to adopt the law; a state’s consistent 
pattern of “disparately impacting members of a particular class of 
persons”; a statute’s historical background, including any history of 
discrimination by the state; and a statute’s use of highly ineffective 
means to promote the legitimate interests asserted by the state.97 
Several courts have found a discriminatory purpose under the 
dormant commerce clause by applying this test.  For example, in 
South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, a provision of the 
South Dakota Constitution generally prohibited corporations from 
acquiring or obtaining an interest in land used for farming and from 
otherwise engaging in farming in South Dakota. 98  The Eight Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the provision was motivated by a 
purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce, based on direct 
evidence including the “pro” statement on a “pro-con” statement 
compiled by Secretary of State Hazeltine and disseminated to South 
Dakota voters, and notes from drafting meetings.99  The court also 
found indirect evidence of discriminatory purpose from “irregularities 
in the drafting process,” including the legislators’ failure to make an 
effort to find information that a ban on corporate farming would 
effectively preserve family farms or protect the environment (the 
purported non-protectionist reasons proffered for the amendment).100 
Significantly, the court in Hazeltine was willing to find an 
unconstitutional purpose to discriminate even though the provision 
was a constitutional amendment, approved by “thousands of citizens 
of South Dakota who voted for [the] Amendment.”101 
In Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a discriminatory purpose had 
prompted Virginia statutory provisions that placed a cap on the 
amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) that could be accepted by 
Virginia landfills and that restricted the use of barges and trucks to 
transport such waste in Virginia.102  In considering plaintiffs’ summary 
judgment motion, the court concluded, “[N]o reasonable juror could 
find that the statutory provisions at issue had a purpose other than to 
reduce the flow of MSW generated outside Virginia into Virginia for 
disposal.”103  The court based this conclusion upon the historical 
 
97. Waste Mgt. Holdings, 252 F. 3d at 336. 
98. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 597 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
99. Id. at 593-94. 
100. Id. at 594-95. 
101. Id. at 596. 
102. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 252 F.3d at 336. 
103. Id. at 340. 
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background and sequence of events leading to the enactment and 
signing of the statutory provisions.104   The sequence of events began 
with news reports that New York City planned to close its Fresh Kills 
landfill and begin exporting more of its MSW, followed by reports of a 
$20,000,000 investment by defendants in a Virginia landfill. These 
news reports launched a political movement by a state senator and 
the governor to curb the flow of out-of-state MSW from entering 
Virginia.105  The movement was evidenced by press releases and 
statements from the senator and Gov. Jim Gilmore, a letter from the 
governor to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and the 
legislative transcript, which established “the General Assembly’s 
general antipathy toward MSW generated outside Virginia.”106 
In Superior FCR Landfill, Inc. v. Wright County, a federal 
district court found that a jury had sufficient evidence to find that a 
county in Minnesota intentionally discriminated against interstate 
commerce when it enacted zoning regulations preventing the 
plaintiff’s expansion of its landfill.107  The direct evidence supporting 
an improper purpose included a commissioner’s campaign statements 
strongly opposing the importation of out-of-state waste and other 
commissioners’ awareness of and concern about the landfill 
expansion’s effect on interstate commerce.108  Indirect evidence 
included a commissioner’s statements discussing the small amount of 
waste being produced locally; a proposal for increased waste 
surcharges in part to slow the amount of out-of-county waste coming 
into the landfill; procedural irregularities in the consideration of 
plaintiff’s expansion request; and a history of discrimination against 
interstate commerce; among other factors.109 
Decisions like these should reassure courts that, although they 
have been reluctant to apply the independent purpose prong under 
Casey, identifying unconstitutional legislative purpose is not 
impossible.  That is particularly true in both the dormant commerce 
clause and abortion contexts.  Economic protectionist purposes can be 
popular among some constituents and therefore are often openly 
expressed by state legislators and officials.  In Waste Management 
 
104. Id. at 336. 
105. Id. at 336-40. 
106. Id. at 339. 
107. Superior FCR Landfill, Inc. v. Wright County, 2002 WL 511460 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 31, 2002) (the court also found that jury had evidence to 
find that the county failed to show that it lacked other, less 
discriminatory alternatives). 
108. Id. at *9-10. 
109. Id. at *3. 
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Holdings, the Fourth Circuit cited public statements opposing out-of-
state waste made by the governor, state legislators, and other state 
officials.110  The governor, for example, had declared that “the home 
state of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison has no intention o[f] 
becoming New York’s dumping grounds.”111   
Likewise, legislators and public officials are often likely to admit 
to a desire to end abortion in order to score political points.  Even 
when they are purportedly passing, signing, or enforcing legislation in 
order to protect women’s health, legislators and public officials have a 
hard time policing themselves and remaining silent about their true 
goal of impeding abortion access.112  In this way, both the dormant 
commerce clause and abortion contexts are unlike contexts such as 
racial discrimination, where it has become rare to see legislators or 
officials frankly expressing discriminatory motivations.  Thus, the 
unconstitutional purposes underlying TRAP laws may be easier to 
identify, and the dormant commerce clause framework provides a 
ready means for doing so. 
C.  Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause Framework to Require a 
Justification for Discriminatory TRAP Laws 
Dormant commerce clause analysis can also be helpful to courts 
willing to require states to justify discriminatory regulation of 
abortion providers and facilities.  The strict test that dormant 
commerce clause doctrine applies to laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce is analogous to what courts should do when laws 
discriminate against abortion facilities or providers.  When laws 
discriminate in this manner, there is actually no need to evaluate 
purpose. Courts use the purpose prong of the dormant clause analysis 
when attempting to discern whether a law that is facially neutral 
towards interstate commerce was nevertheless enacted with a 
discriminatory purpose.113  When a law expressly discriminates against 
interstate commerce, the court does not need to examine purpose.114  
Rather, the court goes on to determine whether the state can offer 
any non-protectionist reason for the discriminatory treatment and, if 
so, whether there are any less discriminatory means of accomplishing 
such purposes.115  Note that this is an indirect way of smoking out an 
illegitimate purpose.  Courts do not require that plaintiffs prove that 
 
110. Waste Mgmt. Holdings,  252 F.3d  at 337. 
111. Id. at 337. 
112. See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 15. 
113. See supra note 96. 
114. See Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992). 
115. See id. at 342-46. 
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economic protectionism is the purpose.  Rather, courts look to 
whether state’s purported non-protectionist purpose holds up to 
scrutiny.116 
The same should hold true for laws that treat abortion differently 
than comparable medical procedures, without claiming potential life 
as a justification.  The reason that the courts apply a strict test to 
laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce is that 
such laws are highly likely to be motivated by the very evil the 
dormant commerce clause aims to prevent: economic protectionism.117  
The long history of discrimination against interstate commerce for 
protectionist purpose warrants the strict evaluation of facially 
discriminatory laws.  Similarly, the evil that the undue burden 
standard aims to prevent is states enacting pre-viability restrictions 
with the intent to burden women’s access to abortion.118  TRAP laws 
virtually always discriminate against abortion providers or facilities 
on their face.  The entire purpose of these laws is to treat abortion in 
a uniquely burdensome manner.  As Priscilla Smith points out:  
The danger that arises in the abortion context is different from 
the danger that arises in the context of a law neutral on its face 
but enacted with discriminatory motive. We are not confronted 
with neutral laws of general applicability that may impact a 
certain racial or religious group disproportionately. We are most 
often confronted with laws that squarely subject abortion 
services, and thus women who seek them, to unique burdens.119 
It is not self-evident from the reasoning in Casey that laws 
purporting to promote women’s health and safety should be permitted 
to treat abortion differently than similar procedures120 or those of 
comparable medical risk,121 absent a medical justification for the 
disparity.  Casey clearly contemplated that laws aiming to promote 
the state’s interest in potential life – that is, laws that regulate 
abortion as a moral decision – should be permitted to single out 
abortion for special treatment.122  Thus, for example, Casey approved 
a law designed to let women know of the state’s preference for 
 
116. See id. 
117. See supra notes 92-93. 
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); see 
supra Part I.B. 
119. Smith, supra note 61, at 1166. 
120. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
121. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
122. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. 
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childbirth.123  The interest in potential life does not exist with respect 
to most other medical procedures.  Thus, recognizing the state’s 
interest in potential life is to recognize its power to treat abortion 
differently than other medical procedures when acting to further that 
interest.     
But courts, including the Supreme Court, have not adequately 
addressed whether or when discrimination against abortion is 
permissible when the state’s justification is medical.  Indeed, they 
generally have not incorporated the fact of such discrimination into 
the legal framework at all.  It is true that differential treatment of 
other medical procedures does not normally trigger closer 
constitutional scrutiny.  But, as in the dormant commerce clause 
context, courts have reason to be skeptical when states decide to treat 
abortion differently, because of the long history of advocates’ and 
elected officials’ resistance to Roe and their attempts to dismantle it 
incrementally.   
As TRAP laws have threatened abortion access in increasingly 
obvious ways, judges have seemed to recognize the need to require 
some justification for special regulation of abortion on health grounds.  
For example, a federal district judge in Alabama reviewing that 
state’s admitting privileges law noted,  
Of course, outside the context of an undue-burden challenge, a 
regulatory decision grounded only in . . . speculation would be 
an acceptable exercise of the State’s police powers. However, 
whether, under Casey, the justification is strong enough to 
warrant the burdens and obstacles that the staff-privileges 
requirement would create for Alabama women seeking abortions 
is another question entirely.124 
Even as early as 1996, a federal district court in Mississippi found 
that the state could not meet its burden of “showing that there is a 
reasonable medical necessity to preserve the woman’s health” in 
requiring ob-gyn residency training for all physicians performing 
abortions; for imposing the building requirements of ambulatory 
surgical centers on abortion facilities that operated very differently 
than such centers; and for requiring a written hospital transfer 
agreement with a nearby hospital.125 
More intriguingly, Judge Posner’s recent opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Planned Parenthood v. Hollen seemed to 
 
123. Id. at 883. 
124. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1376 
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (citation omitted). 
125. Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Thompson, No. 3:96CV596BN, slip op. at *18-
21 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1996). 
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recognize that differential treatment of abortion is suspect.126  
Without pursuing the line of inquiry, the court noted in passing that 
an “issue of equal protection of the laws is lurking in this case.”127  
Judge Posner noted that the “complete absence” of admitting 
privileges requirements for riskier medical procedures suggested that 
the admitting-privileges law’s likely purpose was to impose a 
substantial obstacle to abortion.128 
It makes sense to require states to justify differential treatment of 
abortion when they do not purport to act in furtherance of the 
interest in potential life.  The Casey framework was specifically 
altered to expand the state’s power to promote its interest in 
embryonic or fetal life in the pre-viability period, unlike what was 
permitted under Roe.129  This is the essence of the “Casey 
compromise.”  If the state wants to earn the increased deference of 
the Casey standard, then, it should be required to admit on the 
record that its law is for the protection of potential life.  Otherwise, it 
should forfeit this deference.  States should not be able to assert an 
interest in women’s health, yet still gain the stronger deference 
accorded the interest in potential life. 
Advocates and states enacting restrictions after Roe tended to be 
more focused on expressing their interest in fetal life and in making 
women hear arguments against abortion.  But the anti-abortion 
movement has now shifted tactics in significant part to a medical 
rationale, which they believe is more likely to succeed in the courts.130  
The Casey framework was never really designed for this type of law 
and is ill-suited for evaluating it.  Thus, as with evaluating 
discriminatory laws under the dormant commerce clause, laws that 
discriminate against abortion facilities or providers under a rationale 
of women’s safety rather than potential life should be evaluated under 
a test similar to that applied in dormant commerce clause case law.   
Courts should first ask whether the law discriminates against 
abortion providers on its face.131  If it does, the court should examine 
whether the law is motivated by a purpose other than to impose a 
burden on women seeking abortions.  The state will assert the 
 
126. Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014). 
127. Id. at 790. 
128. Id.  
129. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
130. See BURKE ET AL., supra note 42, at 17. 
131. If the law is facially neutral, the dormant commerce clause test for 
identifying a discriminatory purpose could be applied.  See supra Parts 
I(C)(1); II(B). 
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justification of women’s health.  But, as under the dormant commerce 
clause – where states often assert environmental protection or other 
non-economic-protectionist justifications for laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce – the court’s analysis should not end 
there.  Rather, the court should evaluate whether states could pursue 
the same interest through less discriminatory means.   
This last step is missing as an express step in virtually all TRAP 
decisions, yet it is vitally important.  The inquiry will be a highly 
effective means of identifying whether a law was truly motivated by a 
medical purpose.  For example, if the state were truly concerned that 
abortions performed by suction curettage required special safety 
regulations, it should be equally concerned that similar procedures on 
non-pregnant patients, such as dilation and curettage (D&Cs), were 
regulated similarly.132  The state’s credibility in asserting a women’s 
health rationale is undermined if it is unwilling to treat non-abortion 
patients in a like manner. 
History demonstrates that abortion-discriminatory laws are more 
likely to be motivated by anti-abortion sentiment than women’s 
health.133  This history is similar to the history of state laws that 
discriminate against interstate commerce for economic protectionist 
reasons.  The dormant commerce clause framework is therefore 
eminently suited for analyzing TRAP laws. 
Conclusion 
Anti-abortion advocates and state legislators are increasingly 
turning to a women’s health rationale to justify abortion restrictions.  
While the underlying goal to end abortion access remains the same, 
these laws do not overtly claim to advance the state’s interest in 
potential life.  TRAP laws have proven to be a remarkably effective 
implementation of the incrementalist strategy for eroding access to 
abortion.  The Casey framework, however, is primarily aimed at laws 
that promote the state’s interest in potential life.  Courts have 
differed in how Casey applies to TRAP laws.  Some courts have 
closely scrutinized the rationale underlying TRAP laws, but they have 
tended to tie such inquiries to examinations of the laws’ effects.   
Dormant commerce clause doctrine provides a useful and 
appropriate framework for analyzing TRAP Laws.  The doctrine was 
designed to ferret out a common but illegitimate purpose (promoting 
economic protectionism) underlying laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce.  The framework provides a useful model both for 
 
132. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1336 
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courts wishing to examine TRAP laws’ purposes directly and for 
those who want to require states to justify discriminatory laws that 
purport to regulate abortion purely on medical grounds.  Either way 
the framework is used, it provides a mechanism to examine the 
rationales for TRAP laws independently of their effects, providing a 
potentially helpful option for pre-enforcement challenges, where courts 
may be reluctant to accept predictions of specific effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
